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Abstract	
	 As	the	world	financial	crisis	hit	Europe	in	2008,	the	financial	shock	had	asymmetric	effects	across	the	eurozone;	by	2010,	its	effects	led	to	a	sovereign	debt	crisis	in	the	euro	area.	The	shock	created	a	clear	distinction	between	strong,	core	economies	in	the	European	Monetary	Union	(EMU),	and	a	struggling	indebted	periphery	that	fared	worse	in	the	period	of	crisis.	The	sovereign	debt	crisis	revealed	inherent	fragility	in	the	EMU.	In	light	of	recent	populist	movements,	the	common	currency	is	under	unprecedented	scrutiny.	This	study	seeks	to	assess	the	euro	effect	on	exports	for	a	clearly	distinguished	EMU	core	and	periphery.	Using	an	econometric	analysis,	this	paper	will	also	determine	if	the	euro	effect	has	changed,	with	respect	to	three	time	periods:	pre-crisis,	crisis,	and	post-crisis.	Through	this,	the	euro	effect	on	trade	can	be	better	understood,	as	its	benefits	(in	terms	of	trade	increase)	will	be	identified	for	various	groups	that	may	weigh	the	costs	of	currency	union	differently	in	post-crisis	Europe.	The	results	find	the	euro	effect	on	total	exports	is	about	a	9.5-10.9%	increase.	However,	it	is	found	that	most	of	the	the	euro	effect	on	exports	is	seen	by	the	core.	The	euro	effect	on	trade	is	negatively	impacted	by	the	sovereign	debt	crisis	for	all	EMU	groups,	but	the	core	was	the	only	group	to	have	a	euro	effect	that	remained	positive	during	that	period.			
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I.	Introduction	
i.	The	Euro:	Creation,	Crisis,	&	Concern	
	 The	euro	came	into	existence	on	January	1,	1999,	just	seven		years	after	the	establishment	of	convergence	criteria	set	forth	by	the	Maastricht	Treaty	in	1992.	The	new	European	Monetary	Union1		included	initially	6	countries,	and	has	since	expanded	to	a	union	of	19	of	the	28	current	member	countries	of	the	European	Union2.	Once	an	EU	country	meets	the	Maastricht	convergence	criteria,	it	is	to	further	integrate	by	adopting	the	common	currency3.	A	currency	union	comes	with	economic	benefits:	namely,	easier	trade.	Through	reduced	transaction	costs,	a	single	currency	may	increase	trade	between	member	countries.	There	are	costs	of	joining	the	euro,	however,	with	perhaps	the	greatest	being	the	loss	of	independent	monetary	policy.	The	official	financial	authority	of	the	EMU	is	the	European	Central	Bank4,	whose	function	is	to	safeguard	financial	stability	and	promote	European	financial	integration,	but	exercises	control	on	the	monetary	regimes	of	member	countries	(ECB,	2018).			 Lack	of	fiscal	discipline	in	periphery	euro	countries	presented	issues	for	the	EMU	when	the	effects	of	the	global	financial	crisis	reached	Europe	in	2008.	The	financial	shock	had	asymmetric	effects	across	the	EMU.	The	transition	to	the	sovereign	debt	crisis	occurred	in	2009	when	periphery	countries	reported	large	increases	in	debt	to	GDP	Ratios,	and	government	revisions	of	the	Greek	deficit	showed	that	the	country	had	been	falsifying	its	
                                                
1 Hereafter, “EMU” 
2 See Appendix B for timeline of EMU accessions 
3 Currency union “opt-out” granted to U.K, Denmark, and Poland 
4 Hereafter, “ECB” 
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deficit	numbers	(Lane,	2012).	Rising	yields	on	sovereign	bonds	reflected	credit	risk	in	EMU	periphery	nations.	Subsequently	Greece,	Ireland,	and	Portugal	received	a	series	of	bailouts	from	the	EU	and	IMF	in	2010	and	2011,	with	additional	bailouts	for	Greece	in	2012	and	2015.	The	shock	created	a	clear	distinction	between	strong,	core	economies	in	the	EMU,	and	a	struggling	indebted	periphery	that	fared	worse	in	the	period	of	crisis.			 The	economic	fragility	of	the	EMU	is	not	the	only	criticism.		The	global	rise	of	populist	movements	attack	the	foundations	of	European	integration	the	EMU	was	founded	on.	Sharing	a	common	currency	is	just	as	much	a	political	argument	as	it	is	economic,	and	“nationalistic	sentiments	concern	currency	unions,	not	monetary	unions	in	general”	(Visser,	2000).	This	is	because	a	country’s	physical	currency	may	reflect	a	national	identity.	In	June	2016,	the	United	Kingdom	exited	the	European	Union	customs	union,	with	subsequent	EU-UK	trade	negotiations	take	place	this	year.	In	the	2017	French	presidential	elections,	the	anti-euro,	anti-EU	National	Front	party	leader,	Marine	Le	Pen,	garnered	substantial	momentum	until	her	eventual	loss	to	Emmanuel	Macron.	Coinciding	with	the	British	exit	are	the	terms	“Frexit”	(French	exit),	and	“Grexit”	(Greek	exit).	These	countries	have	received	international	media	attention	in	regard	to	their	position	on	staying	within	the	EU	and	EMU.	In	the	U.S.,	“America	First”	populist	rhetoric	has	been	realized	in	trade	policy	under	the	Trump	Administration	-	with	increased	import	tariffs	on	aluminum	and	steel	resulting	in	a	pending	trade	war	between	the	EU	and	U.S.,	and	the	U.S.	and	China.	In	light	of	these	global	populist	movements,	international	trade	has	come	to	the	forefront	of	economic	policy,	and	the	benefits	of	European	economic	integration	are	under	unprecedented	scrutiny	as	euro	members	recover	from	the	sovereign	debt	crisis	nearly	7	years	after	its	peak.		
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ii.	Research	Questions		 The	effects	of	the	world	financial	crisis	of	2008	and	subsequent	Sovereign	Debt	Crisis	showcased	the	costs	of	joining	the	EMU,	as	asymmetric	shock	brought	the	EMU	periphery	to	its	knees.	Currency	union	literature	focuses	on	the	trade	benefits	associated	with	joining	the	EMU,	but	considering	the	economic	differences	among	EMU	members,	it	is	imperative	to	find	who	realizes	such	benefits.	By	defining	an	EMU	core	and	periphery	that	reflect	economic	differences	in	the	EMU,	this	study	will	address	the	following	research	questions:		
1)	Who	benefits	more	from	the	EMU,	in	terms	of	its	effect	on	exports	–	the	periphery	or	the	
core?	
2)	How	has	the	European	debt	crisis	changed	the	impact	of	the	EMU	on	core	and	periphery	
exports?		
	
iii.	Structure	This	paper	will	continue	as	follows:	Section	II	will	summarize	economic	theory	underpinning	currency	unions,	and	will	outline	recent	empirical	findings	on	the	currency	union	effect	on	trade,	and	more	specifically,	the	euro	effect	on	trade.	Section	II	will	conclude	with	research	that	will	serve	as	a	basis	for	how	this	paper	defines	the	EMU	core	and	periphery	country	groups.	Section	III	will	describe	the	Direction	of	Trade	IMF	dataset	the	IMF	World	Indicators	datasets	used	in	this	study.	Section	III	will	further	provide	descriptive	statistics	and	trade	trends.	Section	IV	will	provide	a	brief	introduction	to	the	
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gravity	model	of	trade,	and	then	will	introduce	the	regression	model	used	in	this	study	and	define	the	variables	used	in	each	model	variation.	Section	V	will	discuss	findings	of	the	regression	model.	Section	VI	will	conclude	the	findings	of	this	study	and	discuss	next	steps	in	the	EMU.		
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II.	Literature	Review:	
i.	Overview	of	Optimum	Currency	Area	(OCA)	Theory	 	
			 The	contribution	of	this	study	is	to	determine	the	currency	union	effect	of	the	core	and	periphery	nations	in	the	EMU.	It	is	then	imperative	to	review	the	economic	theory	justifying	currency	unions	and	the	benefits	they	yield	for	member	countries.	Robert	Mundell’s	seminal	paper,	“A	Theory	of	Optimum	Currency	Areas,”	explores	the	economic	underpinnings	of	currency	unions,	and	the	criteria	by	which	one	can	be	considered	optimal	(Mundell,	1961).			 A	currency	union,	by	definition,	is	a	group	of	nations	with	one	single	currency	and	one	central	bank	with	note	issuing	power.	This	implies	that	each	member	country	forsakes	individual	monetary	policy.	In	a	flexible	exchange	rate	regime,	independent	monetary	policy	enables	a	country	to	combat	domestic	inflationary	and	recessionary	pressures	from	demand	and	supply	side	shocks.	Mundell	(1961)	explains	this	in	the	case	of	a	demand	shift	from	goods	of	country	A	to	country	B,	causing	unemployment	in	country	A	and	inflationary	pressure	in	country	B.	If	prices	do	not	rise	in	B	to	adjust	the	terms	of	trade,	the	full	adjustment	of	the	shock	falls	on	country	A.	In	a	currency	union,		the	central	bank	has	to	decide	the	extent	to	which	to	allow	unemployment	in	deficit	countries	and	inflation	in	surplus	countries.	As	Mundell	argues,	with	the	example	of	the	U.S.	and	Canada,	an	optimum	currency	union	may	be	a	region,	not	a	country.	Mundell	(1961)	emphasizes	that	an	optimum	currency	area	has	significant	labor	mobility,	as	it	may	serve	as	an	adjustment	mechanism	in	the	case	of	demand	shock.	In	the	case	of	demand	shift	from	country	A	to	B,	
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labour	will	move	from	country	A	to	country	B,	thus	combating	unemployment	in	country	A	and	inflationary	pressure	in	country	B.	Important	additions	to	OCA	theory	have	been	made	by	Mckinnon	(1963),	who	asserts	that	factor	mobility	alone	does	not	constitute	an	optimum	currency	union,	but	also	the	economy’s	openness	to	trade.	Mckinnon	(1963)	argues	that	the	more	open	an	economy	is,	the	more	affected	its	cost	of	living	will	be	by	changes	in	foreign	prices;	therefore,	more	open	economies	have	greater	incentive	to	join	currency	unions	because	exchange	rate	changes	may	not	serve	as	an	appropriate	adjustment	mechanism.	Kenen	(1969)	finds	that	product	diversification	is	also	crucial	in	an	optimum	currency	area,	as	a	demand	shift	from	country	A	to	country	B	may	may	be	combated	through	a	change	in	production;	if	country	A	can	produce	the	goods	of	country	B,	this	may	also	serve	as	an	adjustment	mechanism	by	absorbing	the	job	loss	of	goods	from	country	B.		With	these	theoretical	criterion	in	mind,	a	country	considering	union	must	weigh	the	economic	benefits	of	union,	with	the	inherent	costs	of	forsaking	independent	monetary	policy.	The	EMU	project	presented	a	unique	challenge	to	OCA	theory,	as	it	joined	eleven	large	advanced	economies	under	one	central	bank.	Among	its	immediate	criticisms	was	that	the	EMU’s	lack	of	fiscal	stabilizers	made	the	union	inherently	fragile,	and	that	the	area	did	not	comply	with	OCA	theory	criteria	(James,	2012).	Despite	these	objections,	the	EMU	presented	an	opportunity	to	further	integrate	the	single	market,	and	for	member	states	to	benefit	from	reduced	transaction	costs	in	inter-European	trade.		 			
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ii.	Related	Empirical	Research	on	the	Currency	Union	Effect	on	Trade	The	effect	of	common	currencies	on	trade	was	first	seen	in	Andrew	Rose’s	early	paper,	“One	Money,	One	market:	the	Effect	of	Common	Currencies	on	Trade,”	which	assessed	the	separate	effects	of	exchange	rate	volatility	and		common	currencies	on	international	trade	(Rose,	2000).	His	path-breaking	study	found	that	trade	increases	within	currency	unions	by	a	factor	of	three,	all	other	things	equal,	and	that	the	negative	effect	of	exchange	rate	volatility	on	trade	is	less	significant.	Rose’s	findings	were	based	on	panel	data	of	bilateral	trade	observations	for	186	countries,	from	the	years	1970-1990.	In	light	of	the	then-recent	formation	of	the	EMU	in	1999,	Rose	believed	that	his	findings	could	reflect	trade	benefits	for	the	new	eurozone,	even	though	the	set	of	eleven	countries	already	experienced	low	exchange	rate	volatility	prior	to	the	union	(Rose,	2000).	To	capture	this	relationship	between	currency	unions	and	trade,	Rose	uses	an	augmented	gravity	model,	which	serves	as	the	basis	for	further	literature	on	currency	unions	and	trade,	as	well	as	the	empirical	model		this	paper.	In	the	gravity	model,	bilateral	trade	flows	are	explained	by	the	product	of	GDP	between	two	countries,	and	by	the	distance	between	the	two	countries.	Rose	(2000)	augments	this	model	with	dummy	variables	for	the	following:	contiguity,	common	language,		trade	agreements,	and	colonial	relationships	between	countries.	This	model	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	Data	&	Methods	chapter.			 To	address	concerns	in	his	first	paper,	Rose	revisits	the	gravity	model	in	his	paper	“Does	a	Currency	Union	Affect	Trade:	the	Time-Series	Evidence”	(Glick	&	Rose,	2002).	In	this	paper,	written	with	Reuven	Glick,	they	refocus	their	attention	on	a	new	policy	question:	does	adopting	a	common	currency	have	an	increased	effect	on	bilateral	trade?		This	study	uses	a	large	annual	panel	dataset	of	217	countries	from	year	1948	through	
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1997.	Analyzing	changes	in	trade	for	countries	that	left	currency	unions	during	this	period,	they	find	that	adopting	a	common	currency	doubles	bilateral	trade	between	member	countries	(Glick	&	Rose,	2002).	This	policy	question	is	particularly	relevant	in	the	context	of	the	Eurozone,	as	the	EMU	significantly	expanded	throughout	the	2000’s	to	western	European	nations.		Rose’s	work	on	the	currency	union	effect	has	opened	the	discussion	of	the	euro	effect	on	trade	over	the	past	two	decades.	The	subsequent	literature	aims	to	reevaluate	the	euro	effect,	while	addressing	concerns	in	the	early	work	of	Rose	(2000)	and	Glick	&	Rose	(2002);	the	following	studies	have	weakened	Rose’s	initial	currency	union	effects,	but	have	upheld	the	finding	that	the	euro	has	had	a	significantly	positive	effect	on	trade	between	EMU	members.			 Analyzing	the	euro	area	within	Rose’s	framework,	the	effects	of	the	early	EMU	on	trade	were	analyzed	using	a	gravity	model	by	Micco	et	al.	(2003).	During	this	time,	the	benefits	of	the	euro	area	were	re-examined	in	light	of	the	Greece	accession	in	2001,	and	talks	of	further	euro	additions	in	the	coming	decade:	Slovenia	(2007),	Cyrpus	and	Malta	(2008),	and	Slovakia	(2009).	A	common	criticism	of	Rose	(2000)	and	Glick	&	Rose	(2002),	is	that	their	findings		could	not	be	directly	applied	to	the	EMU,	as	many	of	the	currency	pairs	were	from	currency	unions	developed	by	very	small	or	very	poor	nations,	which	is	an	unlikely	comparison	with	the	eurozone	(Micco	et	al.,	2003).	To	address	this	concern,	Micco	et	al.	use	panel	data	for	bilateral	trade	from	1992-2002	for	twenty-two	developed	countries.	Micco	et	al.	find	that	the	EMU	positively	increases	intra	EMU	trade	between	4-10%.	Additionally,	Micco	et	al.	found	that	the	common	currency	positively	affects	trade	between	members	of	the	EMU	and	non-member	countries;	this	effect	on	EMU/non-EMU	trade	is	
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between	8-16%.	This	means	that	membership	in	the	currency	union	not	only	boosted	bilateral	trade	between	EMU	members,	but	also	between	EMU	members	and	their	non-member	trading	partners.		Barr	et	al.	found	an	even	more	significant	euro	trade	effect	in	2003.	Their	study	also	uses	an	augmented	gravity	model,	but	uses	quarterly	data	for	only	EMU	and	EFTA	nations	(11	EMU	members,	6	non-members)	from	1978Q1	to	2002Q1;	additionally,		in	critique	of	Rose	(2000),	their	sample	avoids	using	developing	countries	in	analyzing	the	effects	of	the	euro.	Their	results	find	a	29%	increase	in	trade	for	eurozone	members	(Barr	et	al.,	2003).	Barr	et	al.	use	price	and	output	co-movement	averages	from	1978	to	2002	as	instrumental	variables	to	distinguish	this	increase	in	trade	as	a	result	of	EMU	membership,	from	a	result	of	a	country’s	propensity	to	enter	the	eurozone.		In	contrast	with	previous	works	measuring	bilateral	trade	flows,	Bun	&	Klaassen	(2002)	and	Flam	&	Nordstrom	(2003)	use	the	dependent	variable	of	bilateral	trade	exports	to	analyze	the	currency	union	effect	on	trade.	Bun	&	Klaassen	find	an	increasing	effect	for	EMU	to	EMU	exports	over	time:	a	3.9%	increase	in	1999,	6.9%	in	2000,	and	9.6%	in	2001.	They	estimate	a	37.8%	increase	in	intra-EMU	trade	in	the	long	run,	with	half	of	the	long-run	effect	achieved	in	2006	(Bun	&	Klaassen,	2002).	Contrasting	to	Rose	(2000),	who	found	a	negative	real	exchange	rate	volatility	effect	on	trade	(although	significantly	smaller	effect	than	the	positive	currency	union	effect),	Bun	&	Klaassen	(2002)		find	the	negative	effect	of	real	exchange	rate	on	exports		to	be	statistically	insignificant.	In	Flam	&	Nordstrom’s	(2003)	assessment,	they	also	find	a	positive	effect	of	the	euro	on	exports;	in	comparison	with	their	1989-2002	benchmark,	the	euro	increased	trade	between	euro	countries	by	15%	on	average	for	the	period	1998-2002.		
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These	studies	critically	assess	the	euro	trade	benefit	in	light	of	the	shortcomings	inherent	in	Rose	(2000);	they	are	better	able	to	isolate	euro	effects	by	excluding	many	small,	developing	nations,	and	include	actual	euro	data	post	the	1999	currency	introduction.	However,	these	studies	use	few	years	of	actual	EMU	data.	It	is	imperative	to	review	more	recent	findings,	as	the	eurozone	has	matured	and	expanded	throughout	the	2000’s.		 In	more	recent	literature,	the	EMU	effect	on	trade	is	still	significant,	and	still	found	to	be	smaller	than	Rose’s	initial	currency	union	effect:	Baldwin	and	Taglioni	(2007),	Baldwin	et	al.	(2008),	and	Berger	and	Nitsch	(2008)	have	all	estimated	the	intra	EMU	trade	effect	to	be	less	than	a	15%	increase.	Glick	&	Rose	(2016)	provide	a	much	needed	update	to	their	2002	study	to	include	15	years	of	EMU	data.	In	their	paper,	they	agree	with,	and	statistically	prove,	the	common	criticism	that	the	EMU	is	different	than	other	currency	unions.	Their	2016	paper	uses	trade	data	from	1948	to	2013.	The	study	still	uses	data	from	a	vast	number	of	small,	poor,	countries,	but	separates	the	euro	effect	from	other	currency	unions;	they	find	that	the	EMU	effect	on	trade	is	an	estimated	50%	increase.	In	defense	of	their	still-large,	positive	euro	effect,	Glick	and	Rose	argue	that	studies	narrowly	focusing	on	the	euro	effect	(as	opposed	to	other	unions)	include	time	trend	effects	for	European	economic	integration	may	mask	the	true	effect	of	the	euro	on	trade.		Since	the	euro’s	inception	in	1999	(and	even	before),	there	has	been	disagreement	in	the	economics	literature	as	to	the	extent	to	which	the	EMU	enhances	trade	flows	between	member	countries,	as	well	as	with	non-member	countries.	Despite	disagreement	on	the	extent	to	which	the	euro	has	impacted	trade,	the	vast	amount	of	literature	on	the	topic	overwhelmingly	suggests	that	there	is	a	positive	currency	union	effect	on	trade	within	
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the	EMU,	though	it	may	be	decreasing.	The	policy	question	behind	most	of	this	work	is:	“should	non-member	countries	join	the	eurozone?”	As	countries	in	other	regions	around	the	world	debate	further	economic	integration,	they	weigh	the	benefits	gained	from	one	level	of	integration	to	the	next.	Now,	in	a	post-Brexit	Europe,	policy	questions	have	shifted	toward	the	potential	benefits	of	exit	from	one	level	of	integration	to	the	next.		In	answering	these	questions,	it	is	imperative	to	address	how	gains	in	trade	may	differ	among	countries.		Addressing	a	potential	difference	in	trade	increases	among	different	groups,	Egger	&	Pfaffermayr	(2002)	are	the	first	to	address	a	European	“core”	and	“periphery”	and	how	trade	may	differ	within	and	between	these	groups.	The	paper	finds	the	effect	of	EU	integration	on	trade	flow	between	core	and	periphery	trading	blocs	over	the	period	1960	to	1998.		The	paper	defines	the	first	six	EU	members	as	the	“EU	Core”(Belgium,	France,	Germany,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	and	the	Netherlands)	and	the	remaining	members	as	the	“EU	Periphery.”	Using	a	gravity	model,	Egger	&	Pfaffermayr	estimate	the	effect	of	EU	integration	on	trade	flow	throughout	various	phases	of	integration	in	three	dimensions:	intra-core	trade,	core-periphery	trade,	and	intra-periphery	trade.	Their	results	find	that	core-periphery	and	intra-periphery	trade	have	experienced	stronger	positive	effects	than	intra-core	trade.		Glick	(2017)	focuses	on	the	separation	of	the	regional	trade	agreement	effect	of	the	EU	from	the	EMU	effect	on	trade.	For	the	EU	and	the	EMU,	he	finds	70%	and	40%	European	trade	export	increases	for	older	members,	respectively.	He	finds	even	higher	export	boosts	for	newer	members,	but	argues	that	more	time	is	needed	to	assess	these	gains	in	European	
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trade5.	Both	Egger	&	Pfaffermayr	(2002)	and	Glick	(2017)	provide	insight	as	to	how	European	integration	has	affected	trade	differently	for	different	groups	within	the	EU	and	EMU.	Both	papers	define	these	groups	by	chronology	of	membership.	In	this	thesis,	I	argue	that	chronology	of	membership	does	not	accurately	reflect	the	core	and	periphery	in	the	EMU.			 Much	of	the	gravity	model	literature	on	the	currency	union	effect	on	trade	assesses	the	size	of	two	countries,	the	distance	between	them,	and	a	host	of	other	factors	that	proxy	for	transaction	costs	of	trade.	However,	it	is	imperative	to	keep	in	mind	that	trad	between	two	countries	is	largely	influenced	by	history	and	culture.	In	Campbell	(2008),	he	finds	that	trade	patterns	are	largely	explained	by	culture	and	history,	by	analyzing	habit	persistence	in	consumer	preferences	and	learning-by-doing	in	production.	Campbell	uses	the	example	of	chopsticks	to	explain	that	China	may	export	chopsticks	to	Japan,	not	just	because	they	are	geographically	near	to	one	another,	but	because	Japan	is	“culturally	preconditioned”	to	eat	with	chopsticks.	This	cultural	“pull”	between	these	countries’	trade	is	therefore	influenced	by	culture.	Campbell	(2008)	arguest	that	since	China	has	been	using	chopsticks	for	centuries,	it	is	therefore	more	likely	to	have	an	advantage	in	the	chopsticks	export	market.	This	is	an	imporant	consideration	when	looking	at	trade	between	various	European	countries,	and	particularly	as	we	group	these	countries	in	a	core	and	periphery	reflective	of	currency	union	costs.			 	
                                                
5 Older members defined as countries that joined EMU 1999-2001, and new members defined as post 
2001 members 
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iii.	Defining	an	EMU	Core	and	Periphery		
	 In	their	seminal	work	pre-EMU,	Bayoumi	and	Eichengreen	(1993)	use	data	on	output	and	prices	to	analyze	aggregate	demand	and	supply	disturbances	for	eleven	European	Community	countries	using	a	VAR	decomposition.	They	analyzed	the	coherence	of	the	shocks	among	member	countries,	as	well	as	the	speed	of	adjustment.	In	comparison	with	US	monetary	union	(regional	data),	they	use	EC	shock	data	to	find	that	disturbances	may	have	a	more	idiosyncratic	effect	in	the	proposed	EMU	than	in	the	US.	However,	they		find	a	european	core	that	experiences	shock	cohesion	similar	to	the	US:	Germany,	France,	Belgium,	Luxembourg,	Denmark,	and	the	Netherlands.	In	contrast,	they	find	that	the	United	Kingdom,	Italy,	Spain,	Portugal,	Ireland,	and	Greece	experience	demand	and	supply	shocks	in	a	larger	and	more	idiosyncratic	manner.	Updating	Bayoumi	and	Eichengreen’s	seminal	work	with	real	EMU	data,	Campos	and	Macchiarelli	(2016)	use	the	same	methodology,	sample,	and	time	span	using	data	from	1989	to	2015	to	find	that	this	core-periphery	divide	exists,	but	that	the	pattern	has	weakened	post-EMU.		This	study	will	use	Bayoumi	and	Eichengreen’s	study	as	a	criterion	for	defining	the	core	and	periphery	within	the	EMU.	The	core	will	consist	of	the	five	countries:	Germany,	France,	Belgium,	Luxembourg,	and	the	Netherlands	(excluding	non-EMU	Denmark).	The	periphery	will	be	defined	as	Italy,	Spain,	Portugal,	Ireland	and	Greece	(excluding	non-EMU	United	Kingdom).	This	definition	of	an	EMU	core	and	periphery	is	reflective	of	two	groups	that	may	consider	the	costs	of	monetary	union	differently,	as	they	were	expected	(and	did)	experience	shock	asymmetrically.			
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iv.	Defining	Crisis	
	 This	paper	not	only	seeks	to	determine	the	euro	effect	on	exports	for	core	and	periphery	countries,	but	how	that	potential	trade	benefit	has	changed	with	respect	to	the	European	debt	crisis.	This	paper	will	define	three	crucial	periods	in	the	history	of	the	EMU:	pre-crisis	(1999-2007),	crisis	(2008-2012),	and	post-crisis	(2013-2016).	Phillip	Lane’s	book,	“The	Sovereign	Debt	Crisis”,	he	defines	three	phases	of	the	euro	in	regard	to	the	sovereign	debt	crisis,	which	we	will	use	for	the	purposes	of	this	study.	While	Lane	(2012)	describes	an	“anticipated	post-crisis”	at	the	book’s	2012	publication,	the	2013	to	2016	post-crisis	phase	will	be	further	supported	by	historic	events	that	suggest	recovery	in	the	EMU	from	2013	forward6.			 Lane	(2012)	describes	the	pre-crisis	era	of	the	euro	as	one	in	which	the	growth	performance	and	relatively	benign	financial	environment	hid	the	potential	of	the	crisis	that	was	to	hit	in	2008.	In	the	1999	to	2007	time	period,	low	sovereign	bond	yields	indicated	little	credit	risk	among	euro	countries,	although	countries	like	Italy	and	Greece	had	significantly	increased	their	debt	to	GDP	ratios	since	their	introduction	of	the	euro	in	1999	and	2001,	respectively.	With	the	new	ability	of	borrowing	in	their	own	currency,	the	euro	periphery	experienced	a	credit	boom;	the	periphery	could	now	borrow	without	the	worry	of	exchange	rates	moving	against	them.	At	this	time,	periphery	countries	increased	fiscal	deficits,	while	Germany	experienced	current	account	surplus.	Lane	(2012)	provides	insight	that	the	more	intense	phase	of	the	credit	boom	did	not	start	at	the	inception	of	the	euro,	
                                                
6 All information in Defining Crisis section is from Phillip Lane’s “The Sovereign Debt Crisis” (2012), with 
exception of in-text citations and post-2012 historic information. 
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but	instead	from	2003	to	2007;	this	difference	is	hypothesized	to	be	related	to	the	global	financial	system	and	low,	long-term	prevailing	interest	rates.			 The	crisis	period	began	in	2008,	as	the	world	global	financial	crisis	took	hold	in	Europe.	In	response,	the	ECB	lowered	short-term	rates	and	focused	on	euro-wide	stability.	Lane	(2012)	notes	that	during	2008,	investors	withdrew	from	international	markets,	which	asymmetrically	affected	countries	with	the	greatest	reliance	on	international	funding.	The	global	financial	crisis	drew	attention	to	the	large	current	account	imbalances	in	the	euro	area,	and	the	credit	boom	of	the	pre-crisis	era	came	to	a	halt.	In	2009,	high	deficit-to-GDP	reports	from	Ireland	and	Spain	signaled	trouble	in	the	periphery.	In	October	of	that	year,	Greece	announced	revisions	of	previously	falsely	reported	budget	deficits.	The	transition	from	global	financial	crisis	to	sovereign	debt	crisis	was	reflected	in	rising	sovereign	bond	yields	in	the	EMU	periphery.			 After	IMF/EU	bailouts	of	Greece	(May	2010	&	March	2012),	Ireland	(November	2010),	and	Portugal	(April	2011),	it	was	clear	that	the	euro	area	would	require	fiscal	reform	to	avoid	future	crises.	In	response	to	Lane’s	(2012)	anticipation	of	EMU	reform,	we	define	the	beginning	of	a	post-crisis	EMU	with	the	establishment	of	such	reforms:	namely,	the	Fiscal	Compact.	On	January	1,	2013,	the	Treaty	on	Stability,	Coordination,	and	Governance	in	the	Economic	&	Monetary	Union	came	into	effect.	The	main	provision	of	the	treaty,	the	Fiscal	Compact,	required	new	fiscal	provisions	in	domestic	legislation;	this	compact	bound	the	nineteen	euro	members	as	well	as	Bulgaria,	Denmark,	and	Romania	(European	Commission,	2017).					
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III.	Data	Description	
i.	Dataset	Description	
	 The	dataset	uses	yearly	trade	data	for	the	years	1992	to	2016	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund’s	Direction	of	Trade	Statistics	(DOTS).	Export	data	is	recorded	on	a	free	on	board	(FOB)	basis	and	Imports	are	recorded	on	a	cost,	insurance,	and	freight	(CIF)	basis	(IMF,	2017).	All	trade	data	is	converted	from	domestic	currency	to	current	U.S.	dollars	using	the	highest	available	frequency	of	exchange	rate	available7.	In	Micco	et	al.’s	gravity	model,	a	sample	of	developed	economies	is	used	to	measure	the	Euro	impact,	as	the	EMU	is	a	unique	currency	union	consisting	of	nineteen	large,	developed	economies.	For	the	purpose	of	this	study,	data	is	pulled	for	advanced	economies,	as	defined	by	the	IMF	World	Economic	Outlook	(IMF,	2017).	Our	dataset	includes	over	29,500	trade	observations	for	37	advanced	economies.	Some	countries	have	been	excluded	due	to	insufficient	GDP	or	trade	data8.	Appendix	B	provides	a	table	of	all	IMF	advanced	economies	and	their	relative	economic	size	within	this	advanced	economy	pool.		This	dataset	closely	mirrors	the	lifespan	of	the	euro,	with	observations	beginning	in	the	year	that	the	Maastricht	Treaty	was	signed.	The	dataset	uses	the	most	recent	yearly	trade	data	available	through	the	IMF,	thus	allowing	this	study	to	conduct	the	most	recent	analysis	of	the	euro	effect,	including	seventeen	years	of	EMU	data.		
                                                
7 All information regarding DOTS dataset is from the IMF 2016 Direction of Trade Yearbook, which 
describes the IMF’s most current methodology of reporting and recording trade.  
8 Puerto Rico and San Marino are excluded due to insufficient data. 
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Yearly	GDP	data	is	used	from	the	World	Bank’s	World	Development	Indicators	(WDI)	dataset.	As	defined	by	the	World	Bank,	GDP	is	the	sum	of	gross	value	added	by	all	resident	producers	in	the	economy	plus	any	product	taxes	and	minus	any	subsidies	not	included	in	the	value	of	the	products.	GDP	for	all	countries	is	recorded	in	current	U.S.	dollars,	which	is	determined	by	converting	domestic	currencies	using	the	official	single	year	exchange	rate.	Likewise,	GDP	per	capita	data	is	extracted	from	the	WDI	database,	and	is	recorded	in	current	U.S.	dollars.	GDP	per	capita	is	measured	by	yearly	recorded	GDP	divided	by	midyear	population.		Data	on	Regional	Trade	Agreements	is	from	the	World	Trade	Organization,	and	includes	all	free	trade	agreements	and	customs	unions	between	countries	listed	in	our	dataset.	The	data	will	acknowledge	an	RTA	between	two	countries	starting	in	the	year	that	the	RTA	is	in	force	as	listed	by	the	WTO,	regardless	of	the	month	of	year.	All	data	used	to	determine	EMU	membership	for	dummy	variables	is	from	Politico	Europe,	which	lists	member	countries	by	accession	date.			
ii.	Descriptive	Data	
	 In	its	simplest	form,	the	gravity	model	of	trade	says	that	trade	between	two	countries	will	be	positively	correlated	with	the	product	of	the	economic	“size”	of	two	countries,	and	negatively	impacted	by	the	distance	between	them,	due	to	transaction	costs.	The	dependent	variable	in	this	study	will	be	measured	in	F.O.B.	exports.	Like	prior	studies,	economic	size	will	be	measured	in	terms	of	gross	domestic	product,	and	for	use	in	the	regression	model,	the	natural	log	of	GDP	as	well	as	the	natural	log	of	GDP	per	capita	product	will	be	used.	Distance	is	measured	by	the	natural	log	of	the	distance	in	kilometers	
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between	the	exporting	country	and	the	importing	country.	Table	1	records	the	summary	statistics	for	the	basic	gravity	model	variables.			 	
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Table	1.	Gravity	variables	
Gravity	
Variables	
Min	 Max	 Mean	 Standard	
Deviation	Ln	Exportsij		 4.73	 26.62	 19.24	 2.98	Ln	GDPij	 44.14	 59.87	 52.11	 2.68	Ln	GDP	per	Capitaij	 15.46	 23.18	 20.33	 1.08	Ln	Distance	(km)	 4.12	 9.88	 8.09	 1.09	
	
	 Table	1	shows	that	within	our	advanced	economy	sample,	the	natural	log	of	F.O.B.	exports	has	a	mean	of	19.24,	with	a	large	range	of	export	values	(4.73-26.62).	As	to	be	expected	when	using	an	advanced	economy	sample,	GDP	per	capita	is	defined	within	a	narrower	range.			 Prior	literature	on	the	gravity	model	of	trade	includes	various	dummy	variables	that	factor	into	trade	decisions	between	two	countries.	It	is	likely	that	sharing	a	border	(contiguity)	will	cause	higher	trade,	as	transaction	costs	associated	with	shipping	goods	are	low	between	countries	that	are	very	close	to	one	another.	Further,	a	common	official	language	may	influence	trade,	as	different	official	languages	may	make	trade	more	costly.	Another	augmentation	of	the	gravity	model	is	the	existence	of	a	regional	trade	agreement,	which	is	defined	by	the	WTO	as	an	agreement	between	two	or	more	countries,	including	both	free	trade	agreements	and	customs	unions	(WTO,	2018).	Table	2	shows	the	frequency	of	these	characteristics,	and	their	prevalence	within	our	data.			 	
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Table	2.	Gravity	Augmentations	
Gravity	Augmentations	 Percent	Contiguity	 4.83%	Common	Official	Language	 10.88%	Regional	Trade	Agreement	(RTA)	 41.33%	
	Here,	we	see	that	a	small	portion,	only	4.83%	of	our	trade	data	consists	of	an	exporter	and	importer	that	share	a	border.	Nearly	11%	of	the	countries	in	our	advanced	economy	sample	share	a	common	official	language.	Of	all	advanced	economy	trade	observations	for	1993	to	2016,	41.33%	consisted	of	trade	between	two	countries	with	a	free	trade	agreement	or	a	customs	union.			 	
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		 This	study	will	focus	on	the	currency	union	effect	for	periphery	and	core	countries	in	the	EMU.	To	view	the	currency	union	effect	on	trade	within	the	EMU,	a	dummy	variable	is	used	to	indicate	if	both	the	exporting	and	importing	country	are	EMU	members.	Further,	a	dummy	variable	is	used	for	both	the	core	and	periphery	to	determine	how	the	euro	effect	may	differ	for	core	and	periphery	exports	to	EMU	countries.	Table	3	shows	that	of	our	trade	observations,	12.12%	account	for	trade	between	two	EMU	countries.	Core	and	periphery	exports	to	any	other	EMU	country	account	for	4.0%	of	the	trade	data	each.			
Table	3.	Currency	Union	Effect	
Currency	Union	Variables	 Percent	EMUi	 30.3%	Intra	EMUij	 12.12%	Corei	EMUj	 4.00%	PeripheryiEMUj	 4.00%	
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IV.	Methodology	
i.	Introduction	of	the	Gravity	Model		
	 Originally	brought	into	use	by	Tinbergen	(1962),	the	gravity	model	of	international	trade	is	regarded	as	one	of	the	most	robust	findings	in	economics.	Based	on	Isaac	Newton’s	law	of	gravitational	attraction	between	two	objects,	the	gravity	model	of	trade	indicates	that	the	trade	flow	between	two	countries	is	positively	correlated	with	the	size	of	their	economies	measured	by	GDP,	and	negatively	correlated	with	the	distance	between	the	two	countries.	As	mentioned	in	previous	literature	on	the	currency	union	effect,	this	model	has	been	augmented	by	dummy	variables	to	measure	the	effect	of	other	factors	on	trade:	if	two	countries	share	a	common	language,	share	a	common	border,	are	in	a	free	trade	agreement,	or	in	a	currency	union.		
iii.	Presentation	of	the	Regression	Model	All	gravity	models	used	in	this	study	measure	the	effect	of	independent	variables	on	the	same	dependent	variable	--	the	natural	log	of	bilateral	exports.	In	line	with	gravity	model	convention,	they	include	independent	variables	regarding	the	economic	size	variables:	natural	log	of	GDP	product	and	the	GDP	per	capita	product,	as	well	as	a	distance	variable	measuring	the	natural	log	of	distance	in	kilometers	between	the	exporting	country	and	importing	country.	Augmentations	to	the	model	include	dummy	variables	for	contiguity,	common	official	language,	and	the	existence	of	a	regional	trade	agreement	of	any	kind	between	the	exporting	country	and	importing	country.	All	models	include	year	fixed	effects	to	control	for	year-to-year	trends	in	international	trade.		The	first	gravity	model	used	in	this	study,	which	we	will	call	the	Basic	Model,	is	a	series	of	3	regressions	(i),	(ii),	and	(iii)	that	focus	on	identifying	a	euro	effect	on	trade	and	
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disentangling	this	effect	for	the	core	and	periphery.		Basic	Model	(i)	is	the	simplest	model	of	the	regressions,	and	focuses	on	determining	the	currency	union	effect	on	exports.	As	previous	literature	finds,	adopting	the	Euro	may	also	increase	trade	with	EMU	countries	and	non-EMU	countries9.	This	regression	will	include	dummy	variable	EMUi	that	determines	the	euro	effect	on	all	advanced	economy	bilateral	trade.	EMUi	takes	the	value	of	1	for	all	exports	from	an	EMU	to	any	economy	in	the	advanced	economy	pool.	The	effect	of	the	euro	on	intra-EMU	trade	will	be	determined	by	the	dummy	variable	IntraEMUij	that	is	defined	as	1	for	all	EMU	exports	to	other	EMU	member	countries,	and	as	0	for	EMU	exports	to	non-EMU	countries.	Coefficient	β8	will	determine	the	additional	percent	boost	in	the	euro	effect	on	exports	that	an	EMU	country	gets	when	its	trade	partner	also	shares	the	euro.	The	total	euro	effect	on	exports	can	be	defined	as	the	sum	of	coefficients	for	EMUi	and	
IntraEMUij.	Basic	Model	(ii)	focuses	on	disentangling	the	effect	of	the	euro	on	intra-EMU	trade.	By	adding	dummy	variables	for	the	core	and	periphery,	we	will	be	able	to	tell	how	much	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	trade	differs	between	the	two	groups,	and	the	rest	of	the	non-core,	non-periphery,	EMU.	The	dummy	variable	Corei	EMUj	is	defined	as	1	for	all	core	country	exports	to	any	other	EMU	member.	The	dummy	variable	Peripheryi	EMUj	is	defined	as	1	for	all	periphery	country	exports	to	any	EMU	member	country.	These	variables	of	interest	will	tease	out	any	differences	in	intra-EMU	trade	benefits	between	the	core	and	periphery	of	the	EMU.	The	sum	of	β8	and	β9		will	determine	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	exports	for	core	EMU	members	from.	Likewise,	the	sum	of	β8	and	β10	will	determine	the	
                                                
9 Micco et al. 2003 
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same	effect	for	periphery	EMU	members.	With	core	and	periphery	dummies,	the	variable	
EMUij	will	tell	us	the	intra-EMU	trade	boosts	for	non-core,	non-periphery	EMU	countries.		Basic	Model	(iii)	will	further	explore	the	early	EMU	findings	of	Micco	et	al.	(2003),	who	found	that	the	euro	boosts	developed	economy	bilateral	trade	by	9%	compared	to	two	countries	who	do	not	share	the	euro.	In	Model	(iii),	intra-EMU	trade	variables	will	be	excluded.	In	place	of	the	intra-EMU	variables	of	Basic	Model	(ii),	Model	(iii)	will	include	core	and	periphery	dummies	that	will	separate	the	euro	effect	of	EMU	to	advanced	economy	exports.	Corei	takes	the	value	of	1	for	all	trade	observations	for	which	the	exporter	is	an	EMU	core	member,	and	0	for	all	other	observations.	Peripheryi	will	take	the	value	of	1	for	all	periphery	exports	to	advanced	economies,	and	takes	the	value	of	0	for	all	other	observations.	 	
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Basic	Model	
(i)	Ln(exportsij)	=	β0	+	β1ln(GDPij)	+	β2ln(GDPperCapitaij)	+β3ln(distanceij)+	β4Contiguity	+	
β5Comlang+β6RTA+		β7EMUi		+β8IntraEMUij		δt	+	ε	
	
(ii)	Ln(exportsij)	=	β0	+	β1ln(GDPij)	+	β2ln(GDPperCapitaij)	+β3ln(distanceij)+	β4Contiguity+	
β5Comlang+β6RTA+	β7EMUi	+β8IntraEMUij	+	β9Corei	EMUj+β10Peripheryi	EMUj	+	δt	+	ε	
	
(iii)		Ln(exportsij)	=	Ln(exportsi)	=	β0	+	β1ln(GDPij)	+	β2ln(GDPperCapitaij)	+β3ln(distanceij)+	
β4Contiguity+β5Comlang+β6RTA+β7EMUi	+	β8Corei+β9	Peripheryi	+	δt	+	ε	
	 This	paper	will	examine	the	currency	union	effect	for	the	EMU	core	and	periphery	in	three	distinct	time	periods:	pre-crisis,	crisis,	and	post-crisis.	Crisis	is	a	dummy	variable	defined	as	1	for	all	years	2008	to	2012	and	0	for	all	years	not	defined	within	that	period.	
Postcrisis	is	a	dummy	variable	defined	as	1	for	all	years	2013	to	2016,	and	0	for	all	other	years.	The	Crisis	Model	will	use	interaction	terms	for	crisis	and	post-crisis	time	periods	to	find	any	significant	changes	in	the	euro	effect	on	trade	for	the	entire	EMU,	the	core,	and	the	periphery	from	the	pre-crisis	period	of	1999-2007.	The	Crisis	Model	(i)	will	show	changes	in	the	euro	effect	on	exports	for	each	period.	Crisis	Model	(ii)	will	determine	how	the	crisis	changed	the	effect	on	EMU	to	EMU	trade	for	the	core	and	periphery.	Crisis	Model	(iii)	will	show	changes	in	the	euro	effect	on	EMU	exports	to	all	advanced	economies	for	the	core	and	periphery.		
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Crisis	Model		(i)	Ln(exportsij)	=	β0	+	β1ln(GDPij)	+	β2ln(GDPperCapitaij)	+β3ln(distanceij)+	β4Contiguity+	
β5Comlang+β6RTA+	β7EMUi	+β8IntraEMUij	+β9(crisis*EMUi		)	+	β10(crisis*IntraEMUij	)	+	
β11(postcrisis*EMUi		)+β12(postcrisis*IntraEMUij)	+δt	+	ε		
(ii)	Ln(exportsij)	=	β0	+	β1ln(GDPij)	+	β2ln(GDPperCapitaij)	+β3ln(distanceij)+	β4Contiguity+	
β5Comlang+β6RTA+	β7EMUi	+β8IntraEMUij	+	β9Corei	EMUj+β10Peripheryi	EMUj	+		
β11(crisis*EMUi	)	+β12(crisis*IntraEMUij	)	+	β13(crisis*Corei	EMUj)	+	β14(crisis*Peripheryi	
EMUj)+β15(postcrisis*EMUi)	+	β16(postcrisis*IntraEMUij)	+β17(postcrisis*Corei	EMUj)	+	
β18(postcrisis*Peripheryi	EMUj)	+δt	+	ε	
	
(iii)	Ln(exportsij)	=	β0	+	β1ln(GDPij)	+	β2ln(GDPperCapitaij)	+β3ln(distanceij)+	β4Contiguity+	
β5Comlang+β6RTA+	β7EMUi	+β8Corei	+	β9Peripheryi	+	β10(crisis*EMUi	)	+	β11	(crisis*Corei)	+	
β12(crisis*Peripheryi)	+	β13(postcrisis*EMUi)	+β14(postcrisis*Corei)	+	β15(postcrisis*Peripheryi)	
+δt	+	ε	
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V.	Results	and	Discussion	
i.	Regression	Results	
	
Table	4.	Basic	Model	Regression	Results		
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Looking	at	Basic	Model	(i),	we	see,	in	line	with	gravity	model	convention,	a	significantly	positive	effect	of	GDP	product	between	the	exporting	country	and	importing	country,	and	a	significantly	negative	effect	of	distance	on	trade.	Gravity	dummy	model	augmentations	of	contiguity	and	common	language	also	suggest	a	significant,	positive	effect	on	exports.	Exports	are	increased	by	26.1%	when	two	countries	share	a	land	border.	Surprisingly,	a	common	language	shared	between	two	countries	increases	exports	by	over	100%.	To	explain	such	a	large	effect,	we	can	review	the	common-language	sharing	economies	in	our	advanced	economy	sample.	Among	those	are	the	U.S.,	Canada,	and	the	U.K.	Taking	the	size	of	these	economies	into	consideration,	these	three	IMF	country	codes	accounted	for	a	total	of	45.8%	advanced	economy	trade	in	2017.	A	much	smaller,	european	example	of	a	common	official	language	in	the	sample	is	Germany	and	Austria.	This	large	effect	does	not	differ	greatly	from	the	results	of	Micco	et	al.	(2003),	which	found	an	81%	increase	in	trade	for	common	language	countries,	but	it	is	important	to	consider	that	the	countries	with	the	most	economic	weight	in	the	sample	happen	to	share	the	English	language.		Our	findings	suggest	a	5.9%	increase	in	exports	to	countries	that	share	a	regional	trade	agreement,	significant	at	the	.1%	level.	The	coefficient	of	EMUi	tells	us	the	boost	in	advanced	economy,	non-EMU	trade	received	from	an	exporter	joining	the	euro.	This	tells	us	that	the	euro	currency	will	significantly	increase	trade	by	about	9.5%.	This	finding	is	in	support	of	Micco	et	al.	(2003),	who	found	a	9%	increase	in	EMU	to	non-EMU,	developed	economy	trade.	This	is	explained	by	the	euro’s	role	in	opening	up	economies	to	boost	international	trade.	Basic	Model	(i)	also	serves	to	distinguish	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	trade,	as	the	currency	should	theoretically	increase	trade	among	members	due	to	
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decreased	transaction	costs.	Here,	we	see	that	beyond	gains	from	non-EMU	advanced	economy	trade,	the	euro	will	boost	intra-EMU	trade	to	the	order	of	1.4%,	but	it	is	not	a	significant	increase.	This	means	that	that	in	total,	EMU	countries	will	export	about	10.9%	more	to	EMU	countries	than	will	non-EMU	countries10.	This	means	that	the	euro	effect	on	exports	is	similar,	regardless	of	if	the	importing	country	is	in	the	EMU	or	not.	Our	results	align	with	recent	currency	union	literature	that	find	a	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	trade	to	be	less	than	15%,	with	the	exception	of	Glick	&	Rose	(2016),	who	find	a	50%	EMU	increase.	As	literature	has	been	able	to	use	more	recent,	actual	EMU	trade	data,	this	currency	union	effect	has	dwindled.	Studies	using	real	EMU	data	have	found	less	than	a	15%	increase	in	trade	from	EMU	membership	over	the	past	decade.	Also	unlike	Glick	&	Rose	(2016),	this	study	only	includes	advanced	economies	in	its	sample,	and	uses	a	shorter	time	span	that	reflects	the	life	of	the	euro	currency.11		Basic	Model	(ii)	further	disentangles	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	trade.	As	discussed	in	the	results	from	regression	(i),	the	euro	boosts	exports	from	EMU	members	to	non-EMU	advanced	economies	by	about	9.5%,	all	else	equal,	and	the	euro	will	boost	trade	to	other	EMU	economies	by	about	the	same.	CoreiEMUj	and	PeripheryiEMUj	tease	out	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	exports	for	the	core	and	periphery,	respectively.	In	doing	this,	the	euro	effect	of	the	core	and	periphery	will	be	isolated	from	non-core/periphery	EMU	countries.	Here,	we	see	that	non-core	or	periphery	countries	exporting	to	any	EMU	country	will	experience	a	negative	euro	effect	of	about	5%,	but	the	effect	is	not	statistically	different	from	0.	A	core	EMU	member	exporting	to	an	EMU	country	will	increase	exports	by	19.7%.	
                                                
10 Total impact of euro effect determined by the sum of EMUi and IntraEMUij coefficients. 9.5+1.4=10.9. 
This is statistically different from 0 at the .01% level.  
11 Glick and Rose (2016) observe trade flows from 1948 to 2013. 
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The	total	impact	of	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	trade	for	the	core	is	therefore	a	14.98%	increase12.	Contrastingly,	the	periphery	experiences	a	negative	effect	of	about	half	a	percent,	but	this	finding	is	not	statistically	different	from	zero.	These	results	suggest	that	trade	boosts	in	previous	studies	on	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	trade	may	have	been	concentrated	in	core	trade,	and	not	reflective	of	the	currency	union	effect	for	the	whole	eurozone.			 Basic	Model	(iii)	allows	us	to	review	the	euro	effect	on	exports	to	all	advanced	economies,	with	our	core	and	periphery	dummy	variables	to	tease	out	effects	within	the	eurozone.	Looking	at	the	gravity	model	variables	regarding	GDP	and	distance,	we	find	them	all	statistically	significant,	and	relatively	unchanged	from	Basic	Model	(i)	and	(ii).	Augmentations	of	contiguity	and	common	language	also	have	similar	effects.	However,	when	looking	at	RTA,	we	see	that	the	effect	of	two	countries	being	in	a	regional	trade	agreement	with	one	another	has	both	increased	in	magnitude	and	significance,	with	an	RTA	increasing	bilateral	trade	by	9.2%.		 When	looking	at	the	variable	EMUi	in	regression	(iii),	the	coefficient	tells	us	that	non-core,	non-periphery,	EMU	countries	have	a	7.38%	increase	in	advanced	economy	exports.	Corei	tells	us	that	core	countries	in	the	EMU	have	a	euro	effect	26.4%	greater	than	those	that	are	non-core	or	periphery.	Thus,	the	total	impact	of	the	euro	effect	on	advanced	economy	trade	is	33.78%,	significant	at	the	.01%	level.	In	contrast,	the	periphery	will	experience	a	euro	effect	on	advanced	economy	trade	of	18.1%	less	than	non-core	or	periphery	EMU	countries.	The	total	euro	effect	on	advanced	economy	exports	for	the	periphery	is	an	estimated	decrease	of	10.72%,	significant	at	the	.01%	level.		
                                                
12 Significant at the .01% level 
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	 From	these	findings,	it	appears	that	the	EMU	benefits	as	a	whole	in	terms	of	advanced	economy	exports,	as	seen	in	regression	(i).	However,	the	EMU	core	countries	gain	even	more	in	terms	of	trade	boosts	than	others;	considering	that	the	euro	effect	for	the	periphery	has	a	total	negative	effect	on	advanced	economy	exports.		The	explanation	for	such	differences	can	be	attributed	to	the	EMU	exchange	rate.	As	the	currency	union	exports	increase,	the	demand	for	that	currency	(the	euro)	increases.	When	the	demand	for	a	currency	increases,	it	raises	its	value	relative	to	other	currencies.	An	appreciation	of	the	euro	makes	EMU	goods	more	expensive,	and	thus	more	costly	for	other	countries	to	import.	In	the	case	of	the	euro	periphery,	a	struggling	economy	may	wish	to	devalue	its	currency	to	make	its	goods	cheaper,	thus	increasing	exports.	However,	as	a	member	of	the	currency	union,	they	are	unable	to	do	this.	So	although	the	euro	impact	on	trade	is	significantly	positive,	the	negative	effect	on	periphery	country	exports	can	be	attributed	to	their	inability	to	control	their	exchange	rate.			
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Table	5.	Crisis	Model	(i)	Regression	Results	
	
	 Crisis	Model	(i)	uses	the	same	gravity	variable	augmentations	as	the	Basic	Model,	which	are	included	in	the	table	above.	This	table	shows	us	the	euro	effect	on	exports	throughout	the	three	periods	of	interest:	pre-crisis	(1999-2007),	crisis	(2008-2012),	and	post-crisis	(2013-2016).	This	regression	is	the	most	simple	of	the	Crisis	Model,	and	looks	at	the	euro	effect	on	exports	for	all	EMU	members,	without	core	or	periphery	distinction.	This	model	allows	us	to	look	at	the	general	gains	in	trade	assumed	the	whole	EMU	during	these	
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time	periods.	Models	(ii)	and	(iii)	will	allow	us	to	tease	out	these	effects	for	core,	periphery,	and	all	other	EMU	members.			 The	coefficient	of	EMUi	tells	us	that	during	the	pre-crisis	time	period,	EMU	members	had	21.6%	more	exports	to	non-EMU	countries	than	exporters	not	in	the	EMU,	all	else	equal.	The	coefficient	of	IntraEMUij	shows	that	there	was	no	trade	boost	for	intra-EMU	members,	but	that	a	common	currency	decreased	the	euro	effect	on	exports	by	about	16.3%.	This	negative	effect	could	be	attributed	to	a	lag	in	the	effect	of	the	EMU	on	intra-EMU	trade.	The	total	euro	impact	on	exports	in	the	pre-crisis	time	period	is	about	a	5.3%	increase	for	all	EMU	exports,	which	is	significantly	different	than	013.		 The	crisis	interaction	terms	will	enable	us	to	see	changes	in	the	euro	effect	from	the	pre-crisis	time	period	to	the	period	of	crisis,	defined	as	2008	to	2012.	Here,	we	see	that	the	euro	effect	on	EMU	to	non-EMU	exports	decreased	by	32.2%.	In	contrast,	EMU	members	increased	exports	to	other	EMU	members	by	24.9%,	compared	to	non-EMU	to	EMU	exporters.	The	total	change	in	EMU	exports	during	this	period	shows	that	the	crisis	period	showed	a	negative	change	in	euro	exports	from	the	pre-crisis	period	by	7.4%,	but	is	not	statistically	significant.	The	total	euro	effect	on	trade	in	the	crisis	period	is	therefore	negative	2.1%,	meaning	that	EMU	member	countries	exported	2.1%	less	to	all	advanced	economies	than	did	non-EMU	members,	although	this	finding	is	not	statistically	different	than	0.		Post-crisis	interaction	terms	reveal	the	change	in	the	euro	effect	on	exports	as	the	world	recovered	from	the	world	financial	crisis,	and	the	EMU	recovered	from	the	sovereign	debt	crisis	after	2012.	Compared	to	the	pre-crisis	time	period,	the	EMU	still	had	a	negative	
                                                
13 Significant at the .1% level.  
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impact	on	EMU	to	non-EMU	exports,	but	is	significantly	less	negative	than	that	of	the	crisis	period,	which	signifies	a	recovery	from	the	crisis14.	Looking	at	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	trade,	the	post-crisis	period	shows	a	promising	change	of	34.4%	from	the	pre-crisis	era.	The	total	post-crisis	change	in	the	euro	effect	on	trade	from	the	pre-crisis	to	crisis	is	a	positive	22.3%.	From	this,	we	can	determine	that	the	total	impact	of	the	euro	on	exports	is	27.6%.	This	euro	effect	on	exports	in	the	post-crisis	period	is	significance	tested	at	the	.01%	level.		
 	
                                                
14 Significant at the .01% level.  
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Table	6.	Crisis	Model	(ii)	Regression	Results	
	
	
	
	 Now	that	we	have	found	the	changes	in	the	total	euro	effect	on	exports	in	different	time	periods,	we	can	tease	out	these	effects	for	the	core	and	periphery	EMU	countries,	to	answer	the	question:	who	benefits	the	most	from	the	euro,	and	when?	To	unpack	this,	Crisis	Model	(ii)	will	focus	first	on	intra-EMU	exports.	Crisis	Model	(ii)	shows	the	coefficients	and	robust	standard	errors	for	the	variables	of	interest.	Gravity	model	and	
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augmentation	variables	are	included	in	the	regression	but	excluded	from	the	table15.	The	first	four	variables	focus	on	the	euro	effect	in	the	pre-crisis	time	period.	The	coefficient	of	
EMUi	will	denote	the	euro	effect	on	exports	for	all	EMU	countries	to	non-EMU	countries.	
Intra-EMUij	denotes	the	euro	effect	on	EMU	exports	shared	by	non-core/periphery	EMU	countries	during	the	pre-crisis.	Corei	EMUj	and	Peripheryi	EMUj	coefficients	will	determine	how	much	the	core	or	periphery	euro	effect	on	EMU	exports	differed	from	that	of	the	non-core/periphery	EMU	country	group16.	The	interaction	terms	on	the	next	set	of	8	variables	will	determine	how	the	euro	effect	has	changed	during	the	crisis	and	post-crisis	periods,	relative	to	the	pre-crisis	period.			 Here,	the	EMUi	coefficient	shows	a	21.8%	increase	in	EMU	exports	to	non-EMU	countries	during	the	pre-crisis	period,	which	is	relatively	unchanged	from	the	results	of	regression	(i).	The	non-core/periphery	country	group,	here	determined	by	the	coefficient	of	IntraEMUij	,	appears	to	export	12.7%	less	with	other	EMU	countries	than	do	countries	that	are	not	in	the	eurozone	during	the	pre-crisis	period.	In	comparison,	the	core	trades	about	5%	more	with	the	EMU	than	the	non-core/periphery,	although	this	finding	is	not	significant,	and	still	shows	a	total	negative	euro	effect	on	trade	with	EMU	members.	The	periphery	is	found	to	export	about	12.9%	less	with	the	EMU	than	the	non-core/periphery	group,	totaling	an	impact	of	negative	25.6%	for	the	periphery	in	the	pre-crisis	period.	So	while	Crisis	Model	(i)	finds	a	negative	effect	on	intra-EMU	trade,	it	is	clear	that	these	negative	effects	are	concentrated	in	the	periphery.		
                                                
15 Excluded from table: ln(GDPij), ln(GDPperCapitaij),  ln(distanceij), Contiguity, Comlang, RTA. All 
statistically significant at the .01% level, except RTA which is significant at the .1% level. 
16 For example, coefficient for Intra EMUij will determine non-core, non-periphery euro effect when 
core/periphery variables are included. The Corei EMUj coefficient is then the core group’s difference from 
that change. Total Core impact for that period is the sum of both Intra EMUij  and Corei EMUj  coefficients.  
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	 The	crisis	interaction	term	variables	indicate	changes	in	the	euro	effect	on	trade	from	the	pre-crisis	period	to	the	crisis	period.	As	indicated	in	Crisis	Model	(i),	the	crisis	period	showed	a	significantly	positive	change	for	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	trade,	although	the	total	euro	effect	on	exports	was	null	for	that	period.	Crisis*Intra-EMUij	shows	that	the	change	for	non-core/periphery	countries	showed	nearly	a	1%	increase,	but	is	not	significant.	However,	Crisis*Corei	EMUj		and	Crisis*Peripheryi	EMUj	show	positive	change	in	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	trade	for	the	crisis	period,	to	the	effect	of	42.1%	and	32.1%	for	the	core	and	periphery	groups,	respectively.	These	changes	are	not	significantly	different	from	one	another.	From	this,	we	see	that	the	crisis	period	presented	a	time	when	the	core	and	periphery	both	experienced	similar	gains	in	intra-EMU	trade	boosts	from	the	euro,	while	non-core/periphery	countries	did	not.	However,	the	total	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	exports	for	the	crisis	period	shows	that	an	inequality	still	exists	in	the	currency	union	effect,	despite	equal	gains	between	the	core	and	periphery.	In	the	crisis	period,	the	core	exports	an	additional	35.6%	to	EMU	countries	than	non-EMU	countries	do17.	The	periphery	exports	7.5%	more	than	non-EMU	countries,	and	the	non-core/periphery	group	exports	about	11.8%	less	in	the	crisis	period,	all	else	equal.	However,	we	can	only	attest	that	the	core	experiences	a	significant	effect.			 As	determined	by	Crisis	Model	(i),	the	post-crisis	period	shows	a	significant	increase	in	the	total	euro	effect	on	exports	from	the	pre-crisis	time	period.	As	seen	in	(i),	most	of	this	positive	euro	effect	is	from	gains	intra-EMU	exports.	The	post-crisis	interaction	terms	allow	us	disentangle	this	effect.	From	the	pre-crisis	period	to	the	post-crisis	period,	the	non-core/periphery	countries	had	a	positive	change	of	27.8%	in	the	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	
                                                
17 Significant at the .01% level.  
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exports.	The	coefficients	of	postcrisis*Corei	EMUj	and	postcrisis*Peripheryi	EMUj	tell	us	that	the	core	and	periphery	experienced	a	change	about	7%	and	11%	higher,	respectively,	but	that	they	do	not	statistically	differ	from	the	27.8%	change	seen	in	non-core/periphery	countries.	In	total,	the	non-core/periphery	group	exported	15.1%	more	to	EMU	countries	than	non-EMU	countries	did18.	The	core	exported	27.62%	to	other	EMU	countries	than	did	countries	not	in	the	eurozone19.	The	periphery	shows	an	intra-EMU	trade	boost	of	13.5%	in	the	post-crisis	period,	but	is	not	statistically	different	than	020.	
 	
                                                
18 Sum of coefficients IntraEMUij+postcrisis*IntraEMUij significant at the .05% level. 
19 Sum of coefficients IntraEMUij+Corei EMUj + postcrisis*IntraEMUij+Postcrisis*Corei EMUj . Significant at 
the .01% level. 
20 Sum of coefficients in the same fashion as core calculation.  
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Table	7.	Crisis	Model	(iii)	Regression	Results	
		 Crisis	Model	(iii)	allows	us	an	overview	of	the	entire	euro	effect	(EMU	to	non-EMU	and	EMU	to	EMU)	on	exports	for	the	core	and	periphery.	All	gravity	model	variables	and	augmentations	used	in	previous	Crisis	models	are	included	in	the	regression	but	excluded	from	the	table.	Using	the	same	method	as	Crisis	Model	regressions	(i)	and	(ii),	interaction	terms	will	allow	us	to	distinguish	significant	changes	in	the	euro	effect	from	the	pre-crisis	period	to	both	the	crisis	and	post-crisis	time	periods.	The	variables	EMUi,	Corei,	and	Peripheryi	determine	the	euro	effect	for	non-core/periphery	countries,	core	countries,	and	periphery	countries,	respectively.	Interaction	terms	will	denote	changes	from	the	pre-crisis	
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period	for	stated	variables.	The	results	of	this	model	focus	on	the	total	euro	effect	for	each	EMU	group,	and	how	it	changes	during	each	time	period.			 The	pre-crisis	euro	effect	for	non-core/periphery	country	group	is	a	positive	38.5%,	meaning	that	this	group	will	export	38.5%	more	to	advanced	economies	(both	EMU	and	non-EMU)	than	will	non-EMU	countries.	The	total	euro	effect	for	the	core	group	in	the	pre-crisis	period	shows	a	negative	3.13%	coefficient,	which	means	that	it	trades	about	35.2%	more	to	advanced	economies	than	non-EMU	countries,	but	is	not	statistically	different	from	this	38.5%	non-core/periphery	euro	effect.	The	periphery,	however,	will	export	about	10%	less	to	all	advanced	economies	than	non-EMU	countries	in	the	pre-crisis	period21.			 The	crisis	period	shows	significant	change	in	the	euro	effect	across	all	three	groups.	Non-core/periphery	countries	experienced	a	59.7%	change	from	the	pre-crisis	to	crisis	period,	for	a	total	euro	effect	of	negative	21.2%	in	the	crisis	period22.	The	core	and	periphery	coefficients	show	that	these	groups	fared	significantly	better	than	the	non-core/periphery	group	during	the	crisis	(in	terms	of	total	euro	effect	change),	but	were	still	negatively	impacted.	The	total	euro	effect	for	the	core	group	during	crisis	is	a	28.97%,	compared	to	its	35.2%	effect	in	the	pre-crisis	period23.	The	total	euro	effect	on	exports	for	the	periphery	in	the	crisis	period	is	a	negative	24.7%,	compared	to	its	negative	10%	effect	in	the	pre-crisis	period.24	Here,	we	see	that	the	core	still	experiences	a	positive	euro	effect	on	exports	while	the	rest	of	the	EMU	has	a	significantly	negative	impact.		
                                                
21 0.385+(-.484) = -0.099. This effect is significant at the .01% level.  
22 Significant at the .01% level.  
23 SIgnificant at the .01% level 
24 Significant at the .01% level 
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	 In	the	post-crisis	period,	we	see	change	of	negative	24.3%	for	the	non-core/periphery	country	group,	for	a	total	post-crisis	impact	of	14.2%25.	For	the	core	country	group,	the	total	change	in	euro	effect	is	a	2.1%	increase,	which	accounts	for	a	total	euro	effect	on	exports	of	about	37.5%	in	the	post-crisis	period	26.	The	total	change	in	euro	effect	for	the	periphery	from	pre-crisis	to	post-crisis	is	a	positive	14.9%,	which	determines	a	total	post-crisis	euro	effect	of	5%27.	However,		this	total	crisis	impact	is	not	statistically	different	from	0.			 	
                                                
25 Significant at the .01% level.  
26 2.1% increase determined by sum of postcrisis*corei and postcrisis*EMUi. The 2.1% increase is not 
significantly different than zero. This means that the total euro impact in post-crisis period is not 
statistically different than pre-crisis euro effect.  
27 The increase of 14.9% in total euro effect for the periphery is significant at the .01%.  
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V.	Conclusion	
	 The	purpose	of	this	study	was	to	add	to	the	literature	on	the	currency	union	effect	on	trade,	by	examining	the	effect	of	the	euro	and	how	a	positive	“euro	effect”	on	exports	might	1)	differ	for	certain	groups	within	the	currency	union	who	have	shown	macroeconomic	differences	since	the	euro’s	inception,	and	2)	how	the	recent	world	financial	crisis	and	subsequent	European	sovereign	debt	crisis	may	have	impacted	this	effect.	Our	study	finds	that	there	is	a	significant	euro	effect	on	exports	to	advanced	economies	-	around	a	positive	boost	of	9.5%	for	all	advanced	economy	exports	-	and	about	a	10.9%	for	EMU	to	EMU	countries,	although	these	increases	do	not	statistically	differ	from	one	another.	So	therefore,	there	are	two	components	of	the	total	“euro	effect”	on	exports.		 From	our	1992	to	2016	dataset,	we	find	that	although	the	EMU	as	a	whole	does	not	experience	a	significant	intra-EMU	trade	boost,	the	core	does.	The	EMU	core	will	export	about	15%	more	to	EMU	countries	than	a	non-EMU	member	will.	When	looking	at	the	total	euro	effect	on	all	advanced	economy	trade,	it	is	clear	that	the	core	appears	a	clear	winner	again.	The	EMU	core	will	export	around	34%	more	to	advanced	economies	than	a	non-EMU	member	would,	all	else	equal.	In	contrast,	the	periphery	will	export	10.72%	less	to	advanced	economies	than	a	non-EMU	member	would.	This	can	be	explained	by	exchange	rates.	When	the	EMU	as	a	whole	is	exporting	more,	the	demand	for	the	euro	increases.		When	the	demand	for	a	currency	increases,	it	raises	its	value	relative	to	other	world	currencies.	An	appreciation	of	the	euro	makes	EMU	goods	more	expensive	for	other	countries	to	import.	When	some	countries	(like	the	core)	experience	positive	trade,	others	may	not.	The	periphery	may	wish	to	devalue	its	currency	to	make	its	goods	cheaper	to	
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increase	exports,	but	in	the	case	of	a	common	currency,	it	cannot	control	its	exchange	rate.	Thus,	the	negative	effect	on	all	advanced	economy	trade	for	the	periphery	is	explained	by	its	inability	to	control	its	exchange	rate.	In	both	intra-EMU	and	non-EMU,	advanced	economy	exports,	the	core	benefits	more	from	the	euro.			 Is	this	euro	effect	on	trade	impacted	by	the	sovereign	debt	crisis?	In	short	-	yes.	But	how	does	it	change,	and	for	whom?	This	study	first	looks	at	intra-EMU	trade.	The	core	and	periphery	both	experience	a	negative	euro	effect	on	EMU	exports	in	the	pre-crisis	period,	although	the	periphery	experiences	this	to	a	much	greater	degree.	In	the	crisis	period,	the	core	shows	a	significantly	positive	euro	effect	on	EMU	exports	of	35.6%.	The	periphery	shows	a	positive	effect	of	7.5%,	but	the	effect	is	not	significantly	different	from	0.	Post-crisis,	the	core	has	euro	effect	on	intra-EMU	exports	of	about	27.62%,	while	the	periphery	still	does	not	show	a	significantly	positive	impact	on	exports	to	EMU	countries.	From	this,	we	see	that	the	core	experienced	a	larger	euro	effect	on	Intra-EMU	exports	during	the	crisis,	and	maintained	most	of	that	effect	post-crisis.	The	periphery	did	not	show	a	positive	intra-EMU	trade	boost	relative	to	non-EMU	countries,	but	showed	increase	in	intra-EMU	trade	from	the	pre-crisis	period.	In	terms	of	all	advanced	economy	trade,	the	core,	periphery,	and	non-core/periphery	countries	experienced	similar	trends	in	the	euro	effect	on	all	advanced	economy	trade.	From	pre-crisis	to	crisis,	the	euro	effect	decreased.	From	crisis	to	crisis,	the	euro	effect	on	exports	increased.			 	
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V.	Limitations	&	Future	Research	
	 Although	our	dataset	provides	the	most	recent	analysis	of	the	euro	effect	on	trade,	with	18	years	of	euro	trade	data,	recent	accessions	to	the	eurozone	are	still	difficult	to	analyze.	The	original	members	account	for	the	core	and	periphery	groups	of	this	study,	with	the	exception	of	Greece	joining	two	years	later	in	2001.	However,	the	non-core/periphery	group	changes	over	the	life	of	the	euro	as	new	countries	are	ushered	into	the	currency	union.	For	this	reason,	our	study	is	limited	in	its	analysis	of	non-core/periphery	countries	that	have	recently	introduced	the	euro.			 Another	limitation	of	this	study	is	in	the	selection	of	core	and	periphery	countries.	The	study	of	Bayoumi	&	Eichengreen	(1993)	provides	insight	into	how	a	proposed	EMU	experiences	supply	and	demand	shock,	which	may	influence	how	a	country	perceives	the	economic	costs	of	currency	union.	My	definition	of	the	core	and	periphery	sought	to	align	the	economic	costs	of	currency	union	with	the	economic	benefit	(in	this	paper,	increased	trade);	however,	this	particular	grouping	of	countries	groups	the	strongest	econonomies	in	the	eurozone	and	the	weakest.	Further,	this	study	does	not	control	for	trade	patterns	between	country	pairs,	which	may	also	play	a	role	in	the	currency	union	decision,	as	countries	that	are	already	trading	a	lot	with	one	another	may	be	more	motivated	to	share	a	currency.			 Lastly,	and	most	importantly,	this	study’s	analysis	of	the	euro	is	solely	economic.	The	primary	limitation	of	this	study	is	that	although	economic	literature	may	influence	a	country’s	currency	union	decision,	politics	play	a	significant	role.	A	politicial	persepctive	of	the	benefitcs	of	EMU	member	memebership	for	core	and	periphery	countries	before,	
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during	,	and	after	the	sovereign	debt	crisis	woud	be	benefical	in	providing	a	compehensive	analysis	of	the	euro.	Further,	this	study	uses	historic	trade	data	to	determine	how	euro	countries	may	view	the	euro	benefits	in	the	future.	This	may	be	supplemented	with	future	research	in	political	sentiment	between	the	core	and	periphery	countries	to	determine	how	countries	may	regard	the	euro	and	their	future	within	the	currency	union.			 			 		 		 	
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B.	Appendix	
Table	8.	EMU	Accession	by	Date	
Date	 Country/Countries	January,	1	1999	 Austria,	Belgium,	Finland,	France,	Germany,	Ireland,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	the	Netherlands,	Portugal,	and	Spain	January	1,	2001	 Greece	January	1,	2007	 Slovenia	January	1,	2008	 Cyprus	and	Malta	January	1,	2009	 Slovakia	January	1,	2011	 Estonia	January	1,	2014	 Latvia	January	1,	2015	 Lithuania	*Source:	Politico.eu,	2015.	EU	members	not	in	the	EMU	are:	Bulgaria,	Croatia,	Czech	Republic,	Denmark,	Hungary,	Poland,	Romania,	and	Sweden		
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Table	9.	IMF	Advanced	Economies	&	Percent	total	GDP,	Exports,	and	Population	of	
Advanced	Economy	group		
Advanced	Economies	 GDP	 Exports	of	Goods	
and	Services		
Population	
U.S.	 37.0%	 16.6%	 30.5%	Euro	Area	(19)	 28.1%	 41.2%	 31.9%	Japan	 10.4%	 6.1%	 12%	U.K.	 5.5%	 5.6%	 6.2%	Canada	 3.3%	 3.6%	 3.4%	Other	Advanced	Economies	(16)		 15.6%	 26.9%	 16.0%	*	Source:	IMF,	2017.	Percentage	values	are	of	total	for	Advanced	Economy	group.	Other	advanced	economies:	
Australia,	Czech	Republic,	Denmark,	Hong	Kong	SAR,	Iceland,	Israel,	Republic	of	Korea	(South),	Macao	SAR,	New	
Zealand,	Norway,	Puerto	Rico,	San	Marino,	Singapore,	Sweden,	Switzerland,	and	Taiwan	Province	of	China.	Note	
that	People’s	Democratic	Republic	of	Korea	(North)	is	not	a	member	of	the	IMF	and	therefore	is	excluded.	As	
noted	in	the	paper,	San	Marino	and	Puerto	Rico	are	excluded	from	this	study.		
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Table	10.	Variable	Descriptions	
Variable	 Description	ln(Exports)	 Natural	log	of	Free	on	Board	(FOB)	exports	recorded	in	U.S.	dollars	ln(GDPij)	 Natural	log	of	product	of	gross	domestic	product	for	export	countryI		and	import	countryJ	in	U.S.	dollars	Ln	GDP	per	CapitaiJ	 Product	of	GDP	per	capita	of	export	countryI		and	import	countryJ	in	U.S.	dollars	ln(Distance)	 Natural	log	of	distance	(km)	between	export	and	import	country		Contiguity	 1	If	export	and	import	country	share	a	border	RTA	 1	If	export	and	import	country	are	in	a	regional	trade	agreement:	including	free	trade	agreements	and	customs	unions	(EU)	Common	Official	Language	 1	if	both	export	and	import	country	share	a	common	official	language	EMUi	 1	if	export	country	is	a	member	of	the	European	Monetary	Union	(EMU)	Intra-EMUij	 1	if	export	country	and	import	country	are	members	of	the	EMU	Corei	 1	if	export	country		is	defined	as	EMU	“Core”	country		Peripheryi	 1	if	export	country	is	defined	as	EMU	“Periphery”	country	CoreiEMUj	 1	if	export	country	is	defined	as	“Core”	and	import	country	is	(any)	member	of	the	EMU	PeripheryiEMUj	 1	if	export	country	is	defined	as	“Periphery”	and	import	country	is	(any)	member	of	the	EMU		
